Abstract
<jats:p>Ernst Mach and Edmund Husserl developed as scientists and philosophers during a period when science was becoming the model of rational thought. However, Mach and Husserl had different understandings of the ideals of science and philosophy, and their understandings of the importance of science for philosophy and philosophy for science were radically different. The purpose of the study is to identify the reasons for their differences in views on the goals of scientific knowledge and the ideals of rational knowledge. The results of the study allow us to conclude that Mach, as a representative of positivism, believes that philosophy is too wasteful in its rational means. From Mach’s point of view, a scientist should present clear and consistent principles of research (the principle of economy of thought), achievable goals (description of facts), effective methods of analysis (observations and experiments), and philosophy is permissible in the scientific worldview if it does not contradict such rules of rationality. Husserl, on the contrary, suggests that philosophy should become the foundation of a scientist’s entire research practice, but to do so, it must itself become a «rigorous science». He develops the principle of phenomenological reductions to counter materialistic (naturalistic) and skeptical attitudes. Husserl, beginning with his earliest works, transformed philosophy into a consistent and coherent construction of the description of phenomena, developing a new interpretation of reality as diverse and interconnected meanings and forms of ideas about reality. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the fact that a comparative analysis of the philosophical attitudes of Mach and Husserl allows, on the one hand, to identify the strengths of their theoretical positions, and on the other hand, to clarify important, though not obvious, consequences of the philosophical principles they apply, in particular, the logical sequence of Husserl’s principle of phenomenological reductions and the contradictory sides of the Mach’s principle of economy of thinking. The theoretical and practical significance of the work lies in the fact that the correspondence disputes between Mach and Husserl allow us to more clearly understand some of the consequences of positivist and phenomenological ideas for modern development and the mutual influence of philosophy and science. The obtained results allow us to conclude that the debate about the relationship between philosophical and scientific rational knowledge is far from over and, with the development of science, is becoming even more pressing and productive.</jats:p>