Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>The book argues that Hume was a radical sceptic—that he concluded we have no good reason to believe one thing rather than another about the world around us. This interpretation differs from the views of many contemporary scholars of Hume, who instead emphasize his naturalist bent. In making the case for its interpretation, the book traces Hume’s use of cognitive norms of consistency, clarity, and evidence, and it shows where and how Hume uses them to reject the commonsense assumption that we have a large body of true and justified beliefs about the world. The book pays special attention to Hume’s literary strategies in Book One of A Treatise of Human Nature, arguing that we must not overlook the existence and philosophical significance of his use of irony and narration. Equipped with this way of looking at Hume, the book explains the complex attitude of ironic detachment with which Hume continues his naturalist investigations after reaching his radically sceptical conclusions.</jats:p>